Chernobyl. How it was. 
Instead of the preamble.
Each fragment of this page (including preamble) is the brief resume of the corresponding section of the site, complete account of which is located on another independent page. Fragment begins from the reference to that page. At the same time all fragments taken together form connected text, and it is possible to read it without using the references. It is recommended for the beginning so to do.

The stop of power unit for the PPM is a routine operation. And even if any nonstandard single work is carried out in this case, which is not described in TR (Technical Regulation of operation for power unit) and in the operating instructions of equipment, then the working program of its conducting becomes for the operational personnel the same leading document as regulation and instruction.
If it would be so, then on April 25 1986 on the 4ChNPP (4-th unit of the Chernobyl NPP) the testing (besides turning off the Emergency Core Cooling System ECCS) didn’t affect safety of reactor in any way, since reactor had to be automatically damped at the very beginning of the test. It was necessary only to compose the clear working program of experiment, and coordinate it with other works, conducted on the unit during its stop.
However, all things were not quite thus. The experiment was conducted by leadership of deputy chief engineer of ChNPP A.S. Dyatlov, and he was the author of the test program, where not all was thought out to the end. Therefore tests were dispatched not so much according to the program, as according to the situation and with his active interference in the work of operators. A.S.Dyatlov left after himself memoirs “Chernobyl. How it was.” [D2], and this name is used for the present page. Quotations from this book are given further without the indication of source only by reference to the page of the book.

The beginning of the shut down of the 4ChNPP on the PPM was planned at 00:00 - 25.04.86. The preparatory part of the tests can be carried out before morning 25.04.86 and then the morning shift would to accomplish its major portion. There were reserved 4 hours in the program for entire work on tests (including major and preparatory portions).
But reality proved to be completely different. During the tests, in their end itself in the reactor began an emergency process, which within a few seconds became the fact which was named Chernobyl accident.

Chronology of the events of emergency.
The sequence of events registered in the recent 10 sec., is plotted well in the specific diagram of the development of emergency process. At first a large positive reactivity appears in the reactor and it’s power sharply grows. Then occurs the destruction of core channels, which by the force of some physical and design features of reactor leads to the avalanche-type development of emergency process and finally to the complete destruction of reactor and part of the building of power unit.
Reactor exploded
So, what was the initial event of emergency? How was inserted the initial positive reactivity? Could be this made by reactor safety system itself, which is generaly exist in order to suppress reactor, introducing large negative reactivity.
Special features of reactor RBMK.
Yes, construction of the rods of regulation and reactor physics allow that. And so it was, as it is completely obvious according to all available data. But the Chief Designer [GK] (and the Scientific Leader [NR]) of the reactor didn’t want to agree with such obviousness. And there were no contrivances in which they let not themself in order to prove unprovable (to specialists) and completely “to stir up water” (for the general public). The latter succeeded for them to all 100%.
What is it necessary to make first of all, in order to remove impact from themself and to direct it toward the operational personnel of NPP? Certainly, it is necessary to stir up and to tangle the very concept of the reactor SCRAM system.

Reactor safety system.
No one in reality cut off this reactor safety system and it could not be cut off. Therefore heart-rending howls "slaughtered, killed", left nuclear reactor without the SCRAM system, all that destined for public. And that works, the look was diverted from the reactor SCRAM system, once "it was cut off". About SCRAM all was forgotten, what for it is necessary and what generally it must do.

What else? Well certainly, regulations. The magic word, which causes vague associations in the inexpert person, first with the criminal code, then whether with "the fundamental law of the Russian Federation". Although, in reality, this is altogether only an operating instruction for power unit. But the heart-rending cry apropos of violations of regulations is necessary in order to put off for every body clear in the memory that the reactor exploded precisely (and only) operational personnel, by the fact that the regulations destroyed. And turning off of reactor protection system is one of such violations.

Regulations of operation.
But so, what we have in the dry residue, to whom it is necessary to detach head for the Chernobyl catastrophe? To NPP personnel, which first either did disrupt regulations or not, or to the [GK], who did made the reactor, capable of explode from small ORM (Operational Reactivity Margin)? That is it! Therefore costs (already 20 years) the cry: " hold pilferer”, so that any logic and common sense would sink in that cry.

Well, everything is clear with the public, they are credulous. But what about specialists? You will not take them by cry, they need facts and proofs. If reactor safety system did not introduce into the reactor a positive reactivity, what is the fact that cause it’s acceleration? Answer exists (and not one). This is, for example, cavitation in MCP (as a consequence of the violation of the regulations of operation) and stop of coolant circulation caused by this, its boiling up and further on the described scenario of emergency. Or the break of conduit because of the severe vibration caused by the same reasons and with the same consequences. Well, and if these versions will not be coordinated with the facts, then it means that facts are badly registered.

Alternative versions of emergency.
But even without going into the technical details, there is immediately a fundamental objection against these alternative versions. It is improbable that two events independent from each other randomly coincides in-time with such accuracy: emergency event in the circulation loop and simultaneous pushing on the emergency button.
But there is also a fundamental answer to this objection: which means that these events are not independent but connected. In the reactor appears positive reactivity, the power began sharply to grow, the operator after seeing this pushes the SCRAM button (but reactor safety system is weakened by small ORM, and therefore the process of reactor runaway continues).

And now attention! It is necessary to prove that the power of reactor began sharply to grow earlier than was pushed the SCRAM button, otherwise fit no alternative versions of accident (besides that reactor safety system made the emergency by itself). But how to prove such versions, if registered data don’t show this. Here it is necessary to dodge up to straight sheating. Game goes on the fact that the power of reactor was not recorded by DREG, and record was made only by self-recording unit with a speed of tape drawing 60 mm/h. Any process having a 1 minute duration occupies a place on the tape only 1 mm, which is compared with the thickness of the line, drawn by the feather of instrument. And we speek about process having only some second duration.

The information about the fact that the power began to grow before pushing of SCRAM button, appeared for the first time in the official report (information) at the conference of the experts of the IAEA in August 1986 [Y2]. The text of voluminous report mentions very casually about it. But on the graphs that given there, the power is depicted in the number of much of other.

Report of Soviet experts in the IAEA
According to which data are built the graph in the expert report (fig 17), that is possible only to guess. An exuberance in the power up to the moment of time 01:23: 40 may be consider as completely sucked out of the finger, and it can be even shown how this (exhaustion from the finger) was done.
Freaks & tricks. Read compulsorily.
And what conclusion chief designer from this vibration of the feather of chart recorder? But such. That not on there is the deepest. The power of reactor began sharply to grow to the pushing of SCRAM button.
Imagine that these varigated pattern produced an impression also on the General Procurator's office (where the technical experts were almost completely colleagues of [NIKIET]), and on the law court (which was closed for public). And scientific manager has drawn even a curve in the expert report for the IAEA , how the power changed (Pic. 17).And the matter was made. Now varigated pattern can be removed far down from the eyes (otherwise every body would make fun of you), but the curve in the report of venerable experts remained as allegedly the source of primary information.
All materials on the accident are in front of you, the reader. They were declassified in February 1990. Only minutes of the meeting of the law court above the stuff of NPP remained secret. Why? Surely because it is shameful to show it to the people.
So that, read and compose your own opinion..

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